My main research project focuses on the ethics of personal relationships. In the past, I focused on parental and state duties towards children, while my current project explores questions about romantic relationships between adults. Although my engagement with these questions is philosophical, my research is informed by empirical findings in psychology and neuroscience, and is concerned with implications for social policy. Apart from my main project on relationships, I also work on issues related to labour markets and am concerned, more specifically, with justifications for on-the-job training schemes.
Publications
Peer-reviewed
1. 'Against Credentialism' (co-authored with Tom Parr), Journal of Ethics, forthcoming.
2. 'On the Injustice of Dysfunctional Upbringing', Journal of Applied Philosophy, available online, forthcoming in print.
3. 'Political Liberalism and Cognitive Disability: An Inclusive Account', Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, available online, forthcoming in print.
4. ‘Punishment as Moral Fortification and Non-Consensual Neurointerventions’, Law and Philosophy 2019; 38: 149-167.
5. ‘Does Luck Egalitarianism Lose its Appeal in the Face of Genetic Engineering?’, Bioethica 2015; 1(2): 11-23.
Under Review (titles removed to preserve peer review anonymity)
Paper on subsidising career changes, co-authored with Tom Parr
Paper on the criminogenic consequences of child abuse
Paper on the costs of childrearing
Work in Progress (titles removed to preserve future peer review anonymity)
Paper on the concepts of abuse and neglect
Paper on abusive relationships
Paper on children and Rawlsian Contractualism
Paper on abortion
Paper on the basis of equality and paternalism
1. 'Against Credentialism' (co-authored with Tom Parr), Journal of Ethics, forthcoming.
2. 'On the Injustice of Dysfunctional Upbringing', Journal of Applied Philosophy, available online, forthcoming in print.
3. 'Political Liberalism and Cognitive Disability: An Inclusive Account', Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, available online, forthcoming in print.
4. ‘Punishment as Moral Fortification and Non-Consensual Neurointerventions’, Law and Philosophy 2019; 38: 149-167.
5. ‘Does Luck Egalitarianism Lose its Appeal in the Face of Genetic Engineering?’, Bioethica 2015; 1(2): 11-23.
Under Review (titles removed to preserve peer review anonymity)
Paper on subsidising career changes, co-authored with Tom Parr
Paper on the criminogenic consequences of child abuse
Paper on the costs of childrearing
Work in Progress (titles removed to preserve future peer review anonymity)
Paper on the concepts of abuse and neglect
Paper on abusive relationships
Paper on children and Rawlsian Contractualism
Paper on abortion
Paper on the basis of equality and paternalism
Public engagement
Media
‘Duties To Children’, on the podcast Thoughts: Philosophy Untangled, 2021.
‘Is Graffiti Ever Morally Permissible?’, Practical Ethics: Ethics in the News, 2016 (Honourable Mention, Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics).
Policy Contributions
‘Compulsory Neuroenhancement’, presentation at the Hellenic National Bioethics Commission (with Tom Douglas), Athens, May 2018.
‘Genetic Engineering: An Egalitarian Approach’, presentation at the Hellenic National Bioethics Commission, Athens, March 2015.
Research stage at the Hellenic National Bioethics Commission, 2015.
‘Duties To Children’, on the podcast Thoughts: Philosophy Untangled, 2021.
‘Is Graffiti Ever Morally Permissible?’, Practical Ethics: Ethics in the News, 2016 (Honourable Mention, Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics).
Policy Contributions
‘Compulsory Neuroenhancement’, presentation at the Hellenic National Bioethics Commission (with Tom Douglas), Athens, May 2018.
‘Genetic Engineering: An Egalitarian Approach’, presentation at the Hellenic National Bioethics Commission, Athens, March 2015.
Research stage at the Hellenic National Bioethics Commission, 2015.
Past RESEARCH
My thesis (DPhil Philosophy, Oxford) discusses what I call the question of exclusion, as it applies to Rawlsian contractualism. According to Rawls’s theory, those who participate in the hypothetical contract and to whom political power ought to be justifiable are reasonable and rational. This implies that those who lack these capacities are excluded from the constituencies of justice and legitimacy. My thesis discusses the exclusion of these groups - namely, children, foetuses, unreasonable persons, individuals with cognitive disabilities, and non-human animals. Its aim is to revise Rawlsian contractualism in order to avoid these exclusionary implications and to offer policy suggestions.